The Palestinians, as is well known, are making use of the ancient Jewish strategy of exile and have removed themselves from history. They close their eyes against harsh reality, and stubbornly clamping down their eyelids, they fabricate their promised land.
Introduction
The Exodus narrative functions allegorically in the service of all participants in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. This paper will concentrate specifically on Israeli renderings of this ancient story. The creation of the state of Israel suspends conceptions of Jewish identity between the tropes of Diaspora and homeland, secular Zionism and religious messianism, and the question of Exodus emerges as a central paradigm through which to examine religion as a major facet in what is often considered to be a predominantly secular Israeli identity. Itself caught in the tension between enacting a gesture of belonging and one of escape, the Exodus narrative calls into question the possibility of its central meaning: a going out, a new departure: exodus.
By conjuring the dream of the 'Promised Land', this biblical myth weaves together national and religious sensibilities and projects them onto the same site. In so doing it links nationhood to an economy of redemption and thus seemingly problematizes those narratives that locate Zionism within a framework of so-called 'Exodus politics'. For can a movement drawing on a discourse of redemption also claim to have secularised itself, as Zionism so often states it has done in its particular projection of Jewish identity? Moreover, does the logic of exodus in fact posit secularism as impossible, irrevocably haunted by the religious terms from which it springs and seeks to flee? Does this then mean that 'exodus politics' (Dooley 2001 ), a term deployed by various postmodernist discourses to indicate a dispersal of meaning, in fact traces the gesture of identitarian recuperation which it claims to hold in abeyance?
The physical return of the Jews to the 'Promised Land' seriously problematizes the current trend in contemporary theory to elevate Jewish identity as exemplary of the fundamentally homeless, exiled identities that inhabit the postmodern world.
1 And yet perhaps the failure here is less that Jewish identity falls short of this ideal in practice, and more that the theory not only contradicts itself, but also consistently simplifies the profound need and desire for self-determination which proves much more the shaper of national realities than do facile postmodernist theories. The question that this paper will try to examine is; how does religion relate to the tropes of Diaspora and homeland that shape the nature of the Israeli national investment? And specifically, does Judaism serve to support or undo these distinct and often contradictory foundational premises of the Israeli state? If the latter alternative is the case, then perhaps the biblical Exodus narrative is not such an inappropriate symbol of the act of escape to which its name alludes.
This exploration will take place primarily through the writings of David Grossman, whose construction of Jewish identity is envisaged through the regulating, competing and collaborating tropes of Zionism and Diaspora. 2 Against Grossman's position, whereby a specifically Jewish 'diasporic consciousness' coexists and reconciles itself with the 'ingathering of the exiles' (Avineri 1981, 114 ), I will posit Edward Said's position which argues for the rigorous distinction between 'secular' and 'religious' cultural affiliations. As Zionism has been Said's natural target of criticism, his work speaks particularly powerfully to the debate surrounding the religious genealogy of Jewish identity. Taking account of Said's distinct and broad interpretation of these crucial categories, I argue that his act of separation, like Grossman's act of reconciliation, lies on shaky and ultimately questionable grounds.
Exodus as a blueprint for Zionsim: a debate between Michael Walzer and Edward Said
In 1984 (Walzer 1985, 142) . Said complains that 'Walzer offers no detailed, explicit or principled resistance to the irreducibly sectarian premises of Exodus, still less to the notion of a God as sanguinary as Jahweh directly holding them in place' (Said 1988, 167) .
Thus at the heart of Said's problematization of the Exodus text lies the idea of 'chosenness', an idea which flagrantly underscores the potentially sectarian nature of religious passions and which Said trenchantly positions himself against. It is what he perceives as religion's nativist bent that leads Said to brand all forms of dogmatism and essentialized identity politics as the products of 'religious thinking' (Said 1983).
His critical project thus mobilizes this somewhat radically expanded sense of 'religion' to weed out uncompromising and deeply rooted cultural investments. As a movement which can hardly avoid drawing on the Exodus myth, and whose claim to have severed itself from its religious connections has been precarious at best, Zionism is particularly vulnerable to Said's critique -although, as this paper will attempt to show, perhaps not in quite the way he would have envisaged.
In his book The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish
State, Schlomo Avineri claims that 'at the root of Zionism lies a paradox' (Avineri, 1981, 3) , one which specifically relates to the somewhat anomalous relationship between Jewish identity and the notion of secularism. He writes:
what singled the Jews out from the Christian and Muslim majority communities in whose midst they have resided for two millennia was not only their distinct religious beliefs but also their link -tenuous and nebulous as it might have been -with the distant land of their forefathers. It was because of this that Jews were considered by others -and considered themselves -not only a minority, but a minority in exile (Avineri 1981, 3) .
And yet there was 'on the one hand a deep feeling of attachment to the Land of Israel, becoming perhaps the most distinctive feature of Jewish identity; on the other hand, a quietistic attitude toward any practical or operational consequence of this commitment' (Avineri 1981, 4) .
In other words, it took a secular Jewish movement to actualise the return to the land that religious Jews believed had been promised by God. This was because the practice of Judaism had become so geared towards accommodating life in exile that Jewish religious thought had also developed 'a very strong scepticism about any active intervention in the divine scheme of things. Divine Providence, not human intervention, should determine when and how the Jews will be redeemed from exile and returned to Zion' (Avineri 1981, 4 (Avineri 1981, 189) .
Having recognised this marked schism between Jewish religious and nationalist sensibilities, Avineri goes on to discuss why it was that this dream of a return to Jerusalem, a dream that had remained dormant -apart from the occasional stirring of a messianic movement -for eighteen centuries, became a force for action in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Explanations relating Zionism to the Jewish spiritual link with 'the Land of Israel' clearly fail to account for this specific historical moment. And yet the most commonly proposed argument attributing Zionism to a heightened anti-Semitism also ignores the fact that Jews had been persecuted for centuries and, moreover, Zionism appeared at a time when Jewish communities were emerging as major beneficiaries of the Enlightenment and religious emancipation. It was in fact the new complexities opened up by religious emancipation, Avineri suggests, which largely created Zionism.
Avineri argues that it was the principles of equilibrium and apartness that, in spite of the 'occasional and horrifying breakdown, enabled the Jews to survive in a basically hostile environment' (Avineri 1981, 8 (Walzer in Hart 2000, 191) . This response suggests that Said's notion of secularism is not adequately inflected with an awareness of Jewish cultural difference. And perhaps it cannot therefore deal persuasively with the conflicted terrain that is the Jewish encounter with the 'secular'.
The somewhat anomalous relationship between Judaism and the notion of the 'secular' is illuminated by Nietzsche's genealogy of secularism, which explicitly identifies it with that of Christianity. As Nietzsche's writing shows, the tenets of liberalism and secularism were the offspring of Christian civilization; there is an internalising movement within Christianity that survived the death of god by crowning the modern subject in the figure of Western man (Derrida 2002, 40-102) .
And as Derrida points out, the Kantian thesis, which claimed the possibility of a 'religion within the limits of reason alone' -one based on liberating a reflecting faithin fact stipulated that the subject 'act as though God had abandoned' him. 'The moral law inscribes itself at the bottom of our hearts like a memory of the passion' and 'when it addresses us, it either speaks the idiom of the Christian or is silent' (Derrida 2002, 50) . That this idiom was haunted by the traces of Hebrew from which it originated made the Jewish presence in Europe a continual affront even after the socalled religious Emancipation.
Religious 'freedom' therefore presented itself as a highly qualified category in a language steeped in the terms of covenantal responsibility, one supposedly addressed directly to God. As Derrida asks, 'how can one translate, in the sacred Hebrew or in the semantics enjoined by it, the word Verweltlichung? What is the Jewish equivalent for the spiritual/worldly, sacred/secular opposition, etc? Is there such an equivalent…'? (Derrida 2002, 220) . Derrida uses the German word for secular here as he is discussing a letter written -in German -by Gershom Scholem to Franz Rosenzweig, in which Scholem 'confesses' his concerns over the so-called secularisation of Hebrew, the sacred language. Scholem's letter vividly demonstrates that Jewish immigrants to the promised land did not escape the complexities presented to them by the somewhat culturally alien notion of secularism that had confronted them in the Diaspora and which had hastened their departure. As developments in modern Hebrew literature show, the secular signs that elaborated European ideas of nationhood followed the Jews to Palestine. Nowhere is this vexed Jewish cultural tension between the sacred and the secular, divine providence and human agency, more pronounced than in the sphere of language.
To return momentarily to Said and the colonial comparison, it is perhaps possible to see in the Zionist assumption of agency -somewhat ironically -the 'religious-cultural effects' of a tradition looking more like Christianity than Judaism. As Scholem writes, it is the Christian conviction regarding the redemption which has already come that lends this activism a special seriousness and its special vehemence -and thus its significance in world history. In the Jewish realm, from which it originates, this activism remains singular and strangely powerless precisely because it is aware of the radical difference between the unredeemed world of history and that of the Messianic redemption (Scholem 1971, 16 Scholem is on the one hand, according to Joseph Dan, concerned to demonstrate that 'Zionism is an 'existential' movement, rebelling against the futility of historical activity in an unredeemed world, claiming that historical achievements can be brought forth without any transcendent intervention and without waiting for one or depending on one. Zionism, according to his concept, is a complete departure from all conflicting views and attitudes of Jewish messianism put together: it rebels against the demand to wait for divine redemption, and it refuses to see itself as the culmination of one' (Dan 1992, 126) .
And yet on the other hand, as Derrida points out, 'Scholem acknowledges that Messianism aims at the "re-establishment of a lost [historical] reality", even though "it went beyond that"'. Thus in his letter to Rosenzweig, Scholem presents secularisation both as a risk run by Zionism and as an actual impossibility:
secularisation 'is only a facon de parler', 'a ready-made phrase'. Thus, as Derrida suggests, 'it is a secularisation that allows us to speak of a secularisation that does not take place.' Haunted by the possibility of the impossible, Hebrew is therefore potentially a 'language that turns against those who speak it' (Grossman 1999, 210) , one which incorporates the logic of vengeance and assigns a responsibility which 'exceeds individual responsibility'. Scholem's letter thus reads as a warning to future generations who will have to make sense and re-signify the explosive 'tradition' -one stalked by the threat of secularisation on the one hand and an 'eruption of the 'sacred'
on the other -that is their inheritance (Derrida 2002, p189-228 (Grossman 1999, 165) . Against the brutal reality of deportation to the death camps that lurks behind Nazi euphemisms such as 'exodus or migration' (Grossman 1999, 284 ), Grossman's characters envisage a different kind of escape: 'I don't mean in the usual sense of the word, but in the special sense… someone who crosses the prescribed and generally accepted borders and brings himself into the magnetic field of a different dimension of existence, travelling light…' (Grossman 1999, 100) .
Thus Bruno metamorphizes into a creature of the sea and escapes the fate of European
Jewry by becoming an artist and 'fertilizing language' in order to illustrate that 'the truly crucial things had to be said in the singular' (Grossman 1999, 165-166) .
Similarly, Anshel Wasserman becomes 'a fugitive from human language in order to protect himself from all the words that cut his flesh' (Grossman 1999, 283) . He is the Jew that cannot die, and against the logic of Neigel, the Nazi officer to whom Wasserman tells his story, he does 'wage a war with words' (Grossman 1999, 285) , one that exceeds the power of Neigel's gun that would make him stop. Wasserman's and Bruno's experimentation in narrative therefore interrupts the economy of intentionalized speech, 'a language that will admit a sentence like "I killed your
Jew… In that case, I will now kill yours", etc.' (Grossman 1999, 168) .
In plumbing the depths of the sea, Bruno's 'escape strategy' attempts to find a new way of reading, one which recognizes that 'there are deeper abysses than we can possibly conceive of' (Grossman 1999, 133) . Evading the issues faced by Momik in the novel such as 'how to be a real Jew', Bruno instead loses his identity in 'the vastness of the sea, the joy of life, compassion and communion, and defiance and knowledge of impotence' (Grossman 1999, 130) . In giving himself over to linguistic indeterminacy, in 'murdering' conventional linguistic meaning in order to give language new life, both Bruno and Wasserman recognize their responsibility to language, a responsibility that becomes inseparable from questions of faith.
For against the calculating and brutalized 'rationality' exemplified by the Nazis, these storytellers demonstrate that the enormity of the Holocaust exceeds the human desire to render it meaningful, to capture it through representation. 'While other tragedies can be translated into the language of reality as we know it, the Holocaust cannot, despite the compulsion to try again and again' (Grossman 1999, 124) . The significance of the Nazi crime against humanity exceeds the significance of the Nazis themselves, thus constituting a transgression in the face of Being -Being here suggesting a plurality that constitutes something greater than, and not reducible to, (Grossman 1999, 128) .
Hannah pleads 'God, God, how long must I wait for you, God' (Grossman 1999, 73) and throughout the novel she attempts to 'seduce' him. The seduction metaphor is suggestive of the temptations that much of the Judaic tradition seeks to guard against:
the human desire to usurp the power of God by acting in his name. Unlike in the Christian tradition, Jews were not meant to 'act as if God had abandoned them'. God may be seduced but it is his human agents who must consistently assume responsibility for the consequences of this: it is the Jews that have been 'chosen' to meet the challenge of a dialogue with -and directed by -God. (Grossman 1999, 296) . This deconstructive sense of the need for continual revision recalls Derrida's 'dredging machine' (Derrida 1986, 204) . And indeed the name of 'God' has been explicitly invoked by Derrida in his more recent writings as one of the names, along with 'justice', 'responsibility', the 'other' etc, that act as an interruptive force on the present. This specifically Jewish notion of the messianic, the variant that holds self-identity in abeyance, has thus been a major influence, perhaps the major influence -via the work of Derrida and before him Levinas -on what can very generally be described as 'ethical postmodernism'. I use this very vague term in contradistinction to the celebratory -or indeed pessimistic -theories of postmodernism that act as diagnosis for the contemporary world as opposed to those that seek to re-think it with an eye to change.
These often noted connections between Jewish thought and postmodernism have led some theorists to suggest that Jewish identity is paradigmatic for the sense of homelessness that pervades the postmodern world. Thus Susan Handelman writes:
'the "play of difference" advocated by Derrida is the torment of the Christian thinker, the unacceptable exile.' The Jews, on the other hand, 'are so strangely at home in exile, in the play of signs, in the wanderings of figurative language, and in their own constant physical wanderings' (Handelman 1982, 120) Zionism 'has not given itself up totally to Messianism' (Scholem 1971, 36) . The conflation of notions of Jewish -ethnic -identity with the anti-essentialist identities promoted by postmodernism is a suspect move even when the emphasis is on the diasporic consciousness of Jews living in exile. It becomes even more tenuous when speaking of Zionist notions of Jewish identity that embody a logic decidedly in opposition to Diaspora. This is precisely the move made by Grossman in some of his non-fiction writing, as I will attempt to show below.
In See Under: Love Momik's attempt to tame the 'Nazi beast' represents his own impulse to evade self-definition by the Jewish experience of Diaspora. The crushing burden of his parents' expectations of him lead Momik to scorn their generation who have 'never done anything in their lives to fight back, they just sit there bickering about those stories no one gives a damn about' (Grossman 1999, 83) . And yet his desire for exodus from the past does not lead him to seek the kind of borderless freedom realized by Bruno in the sea. While the underwater population propels itself 'ever onward, wandering homeless', Momik pines for the security of place offered by the promise of solid grounds. As his reaction to the 'Messiah' episode reveals, he 'loves' his 'fetters' and does not want to answer the Messiah, 'the one who calls us to freedom'. The 'final conclusion' offered by the Messiah is one in which all trappings of self-understanding fall away, and while this ultimate loss of identity is proffered as 'the big secret', the 'truth', Momik rejects this chaotic version of reality, claiming that 'some of us need orderly framework, law, to continue.' (Grossman 1999, 166 -184) .
The Messiah episode outlines the cruelty inherent in the denial of human selfdefinition, and it in many ways seems to be Grossman's confirmation that the Jewish desire for self-determination does not dovetail with messianism, it is rather a legitimate deviation from it. And yet writing elsewhere, he seems to suggest otherwise. In his introduction to an edition of Exodus, Grossman vividly depicts this anxious tension in Jewish identity between the figures of Diaspora and homeland. He juxtaposes the Jewish 'taste for wandering' with 'an intense longing for a 'promised land'" and evokes the paradox of 'freedom' which seemingly calls from both directions (Grossman 1998, xii) . Like Walzer, Grossman draws on the Exodus narrative as an allegory for the foundation of the state of Israel and the movement from which it was founded. But Exodus becomes more for Grossman in this piece than simply a founding cultural myth. The 'tortured existence' of the Israelites of 'Exodus' becomes 'a "history" and a religion' (Grossman 1998, x) .While 'history' is placed in quotation marks, he does nonetheless trace his 'forefathers' to 'the children of Israel' while modern Israeli Jerusalem is named 'the promised land' (Grossman 1998, viii) . Given Grossman's position as a critic of Israeli treatment of the displaced Palestinian population, it is perhaps surprising that he deploys such controversial tropes with such apparent ease.
The journey of the Jews to Israel is thus configured by Grossman as a postcolonial 'return', and the 'history' of Exodus lends a 'unique status' to 'the Jewish people', who are particularly 'vulnerable to tragedy in a world that is all definition and borders' (Grossman 1998, xvi) . While Grossman seems concerned in See Under:
Love to portray Israeli self-determination as a protestation against an enforced homelessness, in this piece on Exodus he manages to portray 'wandering' as a 'national end in itself' (Grossman 1998, xiii) (Grossman 1999, 151) , is told by Ruth that he needs to 'admit it isn't the gas chamber every time somebody swears at you at an intersection' (Grossman 1999, 136) . Although this is clearly making a very large leap, this comment can perhaps be connected to Jacqueline Rose's claim about the need to differentiate the debris resulting from Palestinian suicide bombings and that which came from the Nazi death camps (Rose 1996) . In the novel, Fried, who has been 'battered' by life lives it as if it were 'his booty' (Grossman 1999, 354) . Again, perhaps, the connection can be made with another statement by Rose: 'trauma, far from generating freedom, openness to others as well as to the divided and unresolved fragments of a self, leads to a very different kind of fragmentation -one which is, in Freud's own words, "devastating", and causes identities to batten down, to go exactly the other way: towards dogma, the dangers of coercive and coercing forms of faith' (Rose in Said 2003, 76) . Rose offers a corrective to Said by saying 'we should see Freud less as purely the diagnostician of -more squarely inside -the dilemma of identity which he describes' (Rose in Said 2003, 74) , This, of course, is the same dilemma faced by all of the writers discussed in this paper: that their critical insights into identity are considerably tempered by their own personal investments in the collective sense of self. So just as
Wasserman wrests the 'permission' to 'continue the story' (Grossman 1999, 287) from the Nazi officer Neigel who has played a role in actively suppressing it, and In this move his advocated critical mode of the 'exilic consciousness' is granted the right to contemplate the object of 'home'. This then surely transgresses the contours of the irremediably exiled character by which 'secular criticism' defines itself?
What emerges as appealing in Said is that he never succumbs to the temptation to mask over the contradictions in his thinking. While he fails to admit that his insistence on an identity politics for the Palestinians does not remain true to his promotion of nomadic, anti-essentialist self-definition, nowhere is reconciliation attempted. These tensions stand out as glaring and thus productive while those in Grossman, as I have tried to show above, require illumination. Touching on the question of Zionism, Said's 'secular criticism' begins to dissemble, and yet it is this very process that shows the name of 'God' to be both everywhere and nowhere in the discursive field of Jewish identity.
Conclusion: the trauma of chosenness
Through linking Jewish identity to the archetypal self envisioned by discourses of the 'post', theorists take up 'the task of Jewish particularity to universalise itself'. This move needs to be questioned, particularly when deployed in discussions of Zionism for which it can often become an apology. In the same vein Said questions Walzer's use of Exodus as a vehicle with which to merge the religious and the historical. Said therefore objects to the move made by Walzer when he describes the cruelties to which the Hebrews were afflicted as 'the first of a series of attempts on Jewish peoplehood that culminated in the Nazi death camps' (Walzer 1985, 26 ). Walzer's connection here is part of a wider and to some degree understandable tendency to link the historical traumas suffered by the Jewish people to the religious burden of having been chosen by God -a tendency exposed and refuted in Grossman's See Under:
Love. As suggested above, the Jewish tradition is more vulnerable to this confusion than most. Hence Said's approach is helpful in unravelling such textual complicities, yet not necessarily, as he would have it, to guard the secular from the sacred, but rather, and often, to preserve the integrity of what Derrida names the religious 'scruple'. For as Scholem puts it, the decision inherent in Zionism, for better or worse, removed the Jewish people from the nebulous realm of 'meta-history' and consigned them to the planes of 'history' (Scholem 1971, 36 The Zionist movement ran into this fact by founding the Jewish state on the basis of the very ethnic oppression that they wished to leave behind in the Diaspora. The state of Israel is in many ways thus a monument to the anxieties inherent to Judaism surrounding the corruption of power and the potential corruption of religion if it ever came to be identified with that power. Just as Rabbi Kook remained sceptical 'about the desirability of the Jews gaining political power so long as the world is not redeemed' (Avineri 1981, 197 ) -in spite of his fierce support for Zionism -so Ben Gurion confirmed his fears, telling Yeshayahu Lebowitz 'I will never agree to the separation of religion from the State. I want the State to hold religion in the palm of its hand' (Ben Gurion quoted in Leibowitz 1992, 115) . In See Under: Love Neigel mocks the 'Jewish God' who would disallow the rebuilding of the second temple because the king had blood on his hands (Grossman 1999, 406) . This is the kind of 'God' Udi Aloni imagines when he describes 'the transience and the responsibility that is in the secular' (Aloni 2004, 97) . This deconstructive sense of the sacred gestures towards messianic time and aspires to a transformed vision of the world not dissimilar to that encapsulated in the Saidian notion of 'secular criticism'. This notion embodies a much more complex sense of the secular than Said will admit, one which ricochets between the sites of home and alienation, the secular and the sacred, human agency and a postmodern maze of an always already determined world. Just as
Leibowitz portrays 'chosenness' as a goal rather than a gift, Saidian criticism aspires towards and constantly reinvents what it might mean to truly achieve exodus.
